During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.
Introduction
In August 2009, France and Switzerland amended their tax treaty. The two countries agreed to exchange upon request all information necessary for tax enforcement, including bank information otherwise protected by Swiss bank secrecy laws. Over the following months, one of France's richest persons and her wealth manager were taped discussing what to do with two undeclared Swiss bank accounts, worth $160 million. After a visit to Switzerland, the wealth manager concluded that keeping the funds in Swiss banks or bringing them back to France would be too risky. He suggested that the funds be transferred to Hong Kong, Singapore, or Uruguay, three tax havens which had not committed to exchanging information with France. After the tapes were made public, they received extensive newspaper coverage and eventually the funds were repatriated to France.
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The amendment to the French-Swiss tax treaty was part of a global initiative to combat tax evasion. Since the end of the 1990s, the OECD has encouraged tax havens to exchange information with other countries on the basis of bilateral tax treaties, but until 2008 most tax havens declined to sign such treaties. During the financial crisis, the fight against tax evasion became a political priority in rich countries and the pressure on tax havens mounted. At the summit held in April 2009, G20 countries urged each tax haven to sign at least 12 information exchange treaties under the threat of economic sanctions.
Between the summit and the end of 2009, the world's tax havens signed a total of more than 300 treaties. This is by far the largest coordinated action against tax evasion the world has ever seen.
The effectiveness of the G20 tax haven crackdown is highly contested. A positive view asserts that treaties significantly raise the probability of detecting tax evasion and greatly improve tax collection (OECD, 2011) . According to policy makers, "the era of bank secrecy is over" (G20, 2009) . A negative view, on the contrary, asserts that the G20 initiative leaves considerable scope for bank secrecy and brings negligible benefits (Shaxson and Christensen, 2011) . Whether the positive or the negative view is closer to reality is the question we attempt to address in this paper. This is an important question for two reasons. First, the fight against offshore tax evasion is a crucial policy issue. Globalization and the information technology revolution have made it easier for tax evaders to move funds offshore. Absent information exchange between countries, personal capital income taxes cannot be properly enforced, giving rise to substantial revenue losses and putting severe constraints on the design of tax systems. Against the backdrop of the large public deficits faced by most countries since the financial crisis, curbing tax evasion is high on the policy agenda.
Second, although treaties have prevailed as the key policy instrument in the fight against tax evasion, surprisingly little is known about their effectiveness. The G20 crackdown has stirred considerable discussion in policy circles but there is little fact-based evidence of its efficacy and no academic evaluation. The OECD has launched an ambitious peer-review evaluation to assess whether treaties are properly drafted and enforced, but while this legal work is necessary, it is not sufficient: if the information exchange mechanism advocated by the OECD has fundamental shortcomings, then even properly drafted and enforced treaties may be ineffective. Our study is the first attempt to assess from a quantitative perspective the impact of the numerous treaties signed by tax havens since G20 countries have made tax evasion a priority.
Providing compelling evidence on tax evasion is notoriously difficult, and even harder in the complex area of international tax evasion. We break new ground in this field by drawing on an exceptionally rich dataset on cross-border bank deposits. For the purpose of our study, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has given us access to bilateral bank deposit data for 13 major tax havens, including Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands. We thus observe the value of the deposits held by French residents in Switzerland, by German residents in Luxembourg, by U.S. residents in the Cayman Islands and so forth, on a quarterly basis from the end of 2003 to the middle of 2011.
Using specific country names for the sake of concreteness, we ask: Did French holders of Swiss deposits respond to the 2009 French-Swiss treaty by repatriating funds to France? Did they relocate their funds to other tax havens? Or did they simply leave them in Switzerland? To address these questions, after providing more details on offshore tax evasion and the data we use in Section 2, we employ graphical analysis in Section 3 and panel regression analysis in Section 4.
We obtain two main results. First, treaties have had a statistically significant but quite modest impact on bank deposits in tax havens: a treaty between say France and Switzerland causes an approximately 11% decline in the Swiss deposits held by French residents. Second, and more importantly, the treaties signed by tax havens have not triggered significant repatriations of funds, but rather a relocation of deposits between tax havens. We observe this pattern in the aggregate data: the global value of deposits in tax havens remains the same two years after the start of the crackdown, but the havens that have signed many treaties have lost deposits at the expense of those that have signed few. We also observe this pattern in the bilateral panel regressions: after say France and Switzerland sign a treaty, French deposits increase in havens that have no treaty with France.
The finding that tax evaders shift deposits in response to treaties, our key result, illustrates an important pitfall of the current approach to the fight against tax evasion.
Tax havens are whitelisted after signing 12 treaties, leaving considerable scope for tax evaders to ensure that their assets are not covered by a treaty. Our analysis shows that tax evaders do exploit this possibility, which ultimately provides incentives for tax havens to keep their treaty networks at the minimum. From a normative viewpoint, our paper thus lends support to the idea developed theoretically by Elsayyad and Konrad (2011) that a "big bang" multilateral agreement should be preferred to the current sequential approach.
The finding that treaties have had a modestly sized impact on bank deposits has less clear-cut implications. We interpret this result as follows: after a treaty is signed, a fraction of tax evaders move their deposits, but the majority seem not to, plausibly because they consider that treaties do not substantially increase the probability that they be detected. This interpretation casts doubt on whether information sharing agreements could effectively put an end to bank secrecy. It suggests that the OECD could usefully strengthen its standard of information exchange, for instance by promoting automatic rather than upon request information exchange. This interpretation, however, comes with three qualifications. First, the BIS data do not fully separate the deposits of households seeking to evade taxes from those of non-evaders such as multinational corporations. The best available sources suggest that around 50% of the deposits in tax havens belong to households. But should the true household share be 20% or less, the effects we estimate would be consistent with the view that upon request information exchange treaties are a very effective way to affect tax evaders' behavior.
Second, some tax evaders use sham corporations with addresses in Panama and the British Virgin Islands as nominal holders of their bank accounts in Switzerland and other havens, making it hard to know who ultimately owns part of the funds offshore. We tackle this issue, for the first time in this literature, by paying special attention to the deposits held through sham corporations. Section 5 shows that this subset of deposits may have responded strongly to the treaties.
Third, modest changes in the deposit stocks in tax havens do not necessarily imply that information exchange agreements are ineffective. Tax evaders may have reacted to treaties by declaring their assets to tax authorities while keeping them offshore. Section 6 investigates this possibility using a novel dataset with direct information on income that European owners of Swiss accounts voluntarily declare. We find no signs that treaties induced Swiss account holders to comply more with tax laws, but we cannot rule out an increase in compliance in other tax havens.
In sum, while the G20 crackdown has major pitfalls that make any celebration of the "end of bank secrecy" unwarranted, it has nonetheless affected the behavior of a number of tax evaders -contrary to the most pessimistic expectations -and some uncertainties remain about the reactions it has triggered. Our paper adds to the literature on tax treaties, where a recurring finding is that treaties have little real economic effects (e.g., Blonigen and Davies, 2005; di Giovanni, 2005; Louie and Rousslang, 2008) . Relative to this literature, our contribution is to focus on the information sharing provisions included in tax treaties rather than on those aimed at promoting cross-border investments and limiting double taxation. The effectiveness of information sharing mechanisms is rarely assessed and our paper contributes to filling this gap.
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We also contribute to the literature on how tax policies affect international investments (e.g., Chan et al., 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2011) . A branch of this literature initiated by Alworth and Andresen (1992) focuses on the determinants of cross-border deposits such as taxes, interest rate differentials and distance. Huizinga and Nicodème (2004) find that information exchange agreements have no significant effect on cross-border deposits in OECD countries. We focus, by contrast, on how tax treaties affect deposits in tax havens. This evaluation was not possible before 2009, the year when most tax havens started signing information exchange treaties.
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Lastly, our paper sheds new light on the activities taking place in tax havens, a topic which is attracting increasing interest (Desai et al., 2006; Dharmapala, 2008; Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Palan et al., 2010) . Tax havens provide corporations and individuals with opportunities to avoid or evade taxes. The bulk of the literature focuses on the use of tax havens by corporations, following Hines and Rice (1994) . By contrast, we focus on their use by households, which is still little studied.
Offshore Tax Evasion By Households: Context and Data

Policies to Prevent Offshore Tax Evasion
Tax havens such as Switzerland, Singapore, and the Cayman Islands host an important wealth management industry which provides foreigners with an opportunity to evade taxes. If a French household entrusts assets to a French bank, there is automatic reporting of capital income to the French tax authorities: evasion of the personal income tax is 2 A complementary contribution is Blonigen et al. (2011) who study whether information exchange agreements affect foreign direct investments (while we look at bank deposits and tax evasion).
3 Two related papers are Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2009) and Johannesen (2010) , who study the effects of the Savings Directive, a European policy initiative that imposes a tax on interest income earned by European Union residents in a number of tax havens. We discuss in the conclusion the relative merits of withholding taxes and treaties in light of our results.
impossible. But if it entrusts assets to a Swiss bank, there is no reporting by the bank.
French authorities rely on self-reporting to enforce the personal income tax: evasion is possible.
4 Using official Swiss statistics and anomalies in the international investment data of countries, Zucman (2011) estimates that around 8% of households' global financial wealth is held in tax havens. This figure implies substantial tax revenue losses due to outright fraud.
Missing information on income earned through bank accounts in tax havens is the key problem for enforcing personal capital income taxes. Exchange of information between countries is the obvious solution. There are two main ways countries can exchange information: automatically or upon request (Keen and Ligthart, 2006) . Automatic exchange of information is widely acknowledged to be the most effective solution because it allows tax authorities to obtain comprehensive data about income earned by domestic residents in foreign banks. But information exchange upon request is more common. It is the standard promoted by the OECD and embedded in the treaties signed by tax havens.
Under the amended French-Swiss treaty, French authorities can request information from Switzerland to enforce tax laws. Requests must concern specific taxpayers. France cannot ask for a list of all its residents with funds in Switzerland. Moreover, the requested information must be "foreseeably relevant" (OECD, 2008, p. 38) : information can be obtained by French authorities only if they have a well documented suspicion that a resident is evading taxes. All the treaties signed by tax havens have identical wording: they follow the OECD model tax convention.
The usefulness of the OECD standard of information exchange is the object of much controversy. Critics argue that since placing a request for information requires prior knowledge, which is extremely hard to come about, little can be obtained through treaties (Sheppard, 2009 Senate, 2008) , informa-tion exchange upon request is clearly associated with a small probability of detecting tax evasion. Advocates of the OECD standard, on the other hand, stress that even a small probability of detection may be sufficient to deter tax evasion and that information exchange upon request is a major step forward from no exchange at all.
Since the end of the 1990s, the OECD has tried to convince tax havens to sign information exchange treaties. But, as shown by Figure 1 , most havens declined to sign treaties until the financial crisis. In 2004 tax havens signed only 6 treaties and the pace was equally slow before. 
Data on Tax Treaties
To study the effects of the G20 tax haven crackdown, we have compiled a complete dataset on the treaties concluded by tax havens. The dataset covers 52 tax havens (see the Online Appendix), more than 220 potential partner countries, and includes information until the end of 2011q2.
Tax havens can start exchanging information with partner countries on the basis of two types of legal events: new treaties or amendments to existing treaties on the one hand (for instance, the amendment to the French-Swiss tax treaty in August 2009), and changes in domestic laws allowing for information exchange with existing treaty partners 5 All the data on tax treaties and aggregate bank deposits used for this research are available online on the authors' websites.
on the other (Cyprus passed such a law in July 2008). The two types of events are legally equivalent, but new treaties may be more salient than subtle changes in the banking laws of tax havens. Distinguishing between the two kinds of legal events allows us to investigate whether depositors respond differently to more salient events.
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The main data source is the Exchange of Tax Information Portal, which represents the best effort of the OECD to gather accurate information on tax treaties. 
Data on Deposits in Tax Havens
Our second data source is the BIS locational banking statistics, which contain information on foreign bank deposits in 41 countries. The BIS publishes quarterly data aggregated at the country level, for instance total deposits held by French residents in foreign banks and total deposits held by foreign residents in Swiss banks. For our study and on the condition that we do not disclose bilateral information, the BIS has given us access to deposit data at the bilateral level, for instance deposits held by French residents in Swiss banks. There are 18 tax havens reporting to the BIS. We have access to bilateral deposit data for 13 of these havens: Austria, Belgium, the Cayman Islands, Chile, Cyprus, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Panama, and Switzerland. We also have bilateral data for the aggregate of the remaining 5 havens: Bahamas, Bahrain, Hong Kong, the Netherlands Antilles, and Singapore. 8 The 13 havens for which we have bilateral data host about 75% of the deposits of all BIS-reporting havens, which allows us to make reasonable inference from this sample of countries.
The BIS locational banking statistics are widely used in international economics and are a key input to statistics on balance of payments. The most important financial centers (havens and non-havens) report to the BIS. New financial centers are systematically included in the BIS statistics once they reach a significant size, so that the havens not covered are by construction very small. Further, within each covered center there is almost full coverage of deposits, because all the banks with cross-border positions in excess of a modest threshold (e.g., $10 million in the Bahamas) are required to report.
The BIS (2006) indicates that coverage rates systematically exceed 90%. The reporting requirements of the BIS do not violate any bank secrecy provisions, because banks do not report data on individual customers but only aggregate figures.
The BIS data, however, have three limitations. First, it is not possible to know what fraction of the deposits in tax havens belong to households evading taxes. The BIS provides a sectoral decomposition between deposits owned by banks and by "non-banks."
Since interbank deposits do not play a role in personal income tax evasion, we focus on the deposits of "non-banks." Part of these deposits, however, belong to multinational corporations that stash cash offshore and that are not affected by bank information sharing. Ideally we would like to observe the deposits that belong to households only.
Since this is not possible, we cannot directly estimate the behavioral response of tax evaders: all we can do is making inference from the evolution of the deposits owned by "non-banks."
To do so, we need an idea of what fraction of "non-bank" deposits belong to households. Data made available by a number of BIS-participating central banks enable us to shed light on this issue. In Switzerland, the second largest offshore center in terms of "non-bank" deposits, 80-90% of the deposits seem to belong to households. 9 The Bank of England reports that in 2007 households owned about 70-75% of the deposits in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, collectively the third largest offshore center. And a previous study (Zucman, 2011) , using completely different data, found that at least 50% of haven deposits likely belong to households. 10 On the basis of these elements, our baseline assumption when we interpret the results will be that tax evaders own about 50% of the deposits in tax havens.
There is, of course, some margin of uncertainty involved here. Most tax havens, Lastly, the BIS data relate to only one form of wealth held by households in tax havens: bank deposits. They do not provide information on the equity and bond portfolios that 9 There are two types of Swiss bank deposits covered by the BIS data: regular deposits (10-20% of the total) and "fiduciary deposits" (80-90%). In all likelihood, fiduciary deposits entirely belong to individuals: these are investments made by Swiss banks in foreign money markets on behalf of foreign individuals, an arrangement that enables clients of Swiss banks to avoid the 35% tax imposed by Switzerland on Swiss-source capital income. Multinational corporations do not use fiduciary deposits because they can directly invest in foreign money markets without having to pay the handsome fees charged by Swiss banks for these operations. For more details on fiduciary deposits, see e.g. Brown et al. (2011) .
10 The figure was obtained as follows. On the basis of official Swiss National Bank statistics and of large anomalies in the international investment data of countries, Zucman (2011) estimates that individuals owned at least $6tr in financial assets through bank accounts in tax havens, of which $1.4 tr took the form of bank deposits. These $1.4 tr account for 50% of the total deposits in tax havens as per the BIS.
11 Anecdotal evidence suggests most holders of offshore accounts do not comply. Out of the 20,000 accounts held by U.S. residents with UBS Switzerland in 2007, only 1,000 or so were declared to the IRS (U.S. Senate, 2008, p. 84 ). See Section 6 below for more data on compliance.
savers entrust to tax haven banks. There is little public information on households' offshore portfolios, except in Switzerland. The Swiss National Bank reports that about 25% of the funds held by foreigners in Switzerland take the form of bank deposits, while 75% are equities and bonds (Zucman, 2011) . With the data at our disposal, we cannot say anything about the response of tax evaders' portfolio wealth to treaties: we can only analyze the evolution of deposits. When drawing policy implications, we will assume that the response of bank deposits is a good proxy for the response of the overall stock of household offshore wealth, since the information exchange provisions of treaties affect all assets similarly.
Graphical Evidence
The Effects of the G20 Initiative on Aggregate Deposits
As a starting point for the empirical analysis, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the bank deposits held on aggregate in the 18 tax havens reporting to the BIS. Despite the wave of treaties signed in 2009-2010, deposits in tax havens remained stable over the [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] period at around $2,700 billion. For comparison, the figure shows the evolution of the deposits held on aggregate in the non-haven countries reporting to the BIS. This group includes financial centers that have a large treaty network and have not been affected by the G20 initiative, such as the U.S. or Germany. Deposits in havens and non-havens have followed a similar trend over the 2004-2011 period. The evolution of deposits in nonhavens might be an imperfect counterfactual for the evolution of deposits in tax havens, but we can at least exclude that the G20 crackdown was followed by a significant drop in aggregate deposits in tax havens.
Next, we compare the deposits that have become covered by a treaty to the deposits that have not. We consider all country-haven combinations (e.g., France-Switzerland) among the 13 havens for which we have bilateral deposit data and the more than 200 countries holding deposits in these havens. From this universe, we construct two groups: a "treaty" group including all country-haven pairs that signed a compliant treaty between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2011, and a "no-treaty" group including all other pairs. Figure   3 shows that deposits decreased moderately in the "treaty" group but remained roughly stable in the "no-treaty" group. Should all deposits have followed the same trend, the deposits in the "treaty" group would have been around 15% larger in 2011. Figure 3 suggests that at least some tax evaders responded to treaty signatures, although it does not reveal the nature of this response.
The Effects of the G20 Initiative on the Deposits in Each Tax Haven
To investigate how tax evaders responded to treaties, we examine the evolution of deposits A simple bivariate regression suggests that an additional treaty signed by a haven is associated with a decrease of 3.8% of the deposits in its banks (with a standard error of 1.4%).
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Overall, the graphical evidence suggests that a number of tax evaders responded to treaties and that their response was mostly to transfer deposits to other tax havens, leaving roughly unchanged the funds globally held in tax havens. While the graphical evidence suggests a consistent scenario, it aggregates treaties signed at different dates and does not fully exploit the bilateral nature of our data. To deal with this, we now turn to panel regression analysis.
Regression-Based Evidence
The Impact of Treaties on Bilateral Deposits
The first question we want to address is whether treaties have had a statistically significant impact on deposits in tax havens at the bilateral level. We run regressions of the form:
where Deposits ijq denotes the deposits held by residents of country i with banks of haven j at the end of quarter q, Signed ijq is a dummy equal to 1 if a treaty allowing for information exchange between i and j exists in quarter q, γ ij denotes country-pair fixed effects, and θ q time fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β: should treaties have any effect at all, β should be statistically different from zero. The country-pair fixed effects γ ij control for all time invariant characteristics of country-haven pairs, such as distance or common language. The time fixed effects θ q control for all common time trends affecting the deposits in tax havens, such as the financial crisis. Thus, β only captures the deposit changes in the "treaty" country-haven pairs that come in addition to the deposit changes in the "no-treaty" pairs. All the regressions use the sample period 2003q4-2011q2 and have robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level.
The first column of Table 1 estimates equation 1 using the complete universe of country-haven pairs for which we have bilateral deposit data. We find that the deposits of the "treaty" pairs are smaller after treaty signature than before relative to the deposits of the "no treaty" pairs. But the coefficient is only borderline significant.
We then in col. (2) restrict the sample to the universe of pairs that include one haven and one non-haven country, in order for our coefficient β to exclude the effect of the treaties signed by havens with each other on haven-haven deposits. Treaties now have a larger effect; β is different from zero at the 5% level. Col. (3) investigates the effect of haven-haven treaties on haven-haven deposits. We find that a treaty between say the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Jersey does not affect the deposits "held by" the BVI in Jersey, consistent with our notion that treaties between two havens have no economic meaning. We continue the analysis with the sample that excludes haven-haven pairs. We refer the reader to Section 5 for a detailed analysis of how haven-haven deposits have responded to treaties between haven and non-haven countries.
In col. (4), we investigate whether depositors respond differently to new treaties and to changes in the domestic laws of tax havens. Since new treaties are more salient to tax evaders, we conjecture that evaders should respond more to new treaties. We interact the dummy variable Signed with dummy variables indicating whether the legal event establishing information exchange is a new treaty or a change in domestic law. The results show that new treaties affect deposits but equivalent changes in domestic laws do not.
The timing of the response to treaty signature is analyzed in col. (5). We include a dummy equal to one in the quarter q of the legal event establishing information exchange (Contemp), three dummies equal to one in q+1, q+2, and q+3 respectively, and a dummy equal to one in all quarters after q + 3. We find that the bulk of the response occurs two quarters and more after treaty signature. A plausible explanation is that treaties do not enter into force immediately after they are signed. For instance, the amendment to the French-Swiss treaty signed in August 2009 entered into force in November 2010.
Typically, there is a time lag of 3-5 quarters between treaty signature and entry into force. Table 1 confirms that there is a correlation between treaties and deposits in tax havens:
on average, the deposits in the "treaty" pairs decrease after treaty signature relative to the deposits in the "no treaty" pairs. Another issue in the interpretation of the magnitude of β is that if tax evaders respond to treaties by shifting deposits, then our comparison group of "no treaty" country-pairs is also affected by treaty signature. We now augment the model to tackle this issue. (Johannesen, 2010) .
Deposit Shifting
The number of treaties signed is a crude measure of treaty coverage. Treaties with Switzerland and Luxembourg are much more important for France in fighting tax evasion 15 The fact we do not have bilateral data for all the world's tax havens does not bias our estimate of the magnitude of shifting. Having more bilateral data would simply make our estimate more precise.
16 In col. (2) of Table 2 , Signed appears in three places, all of which need to be accounted for when computing the total effect of an additional treaty on bilateral deposit. Assuming that treaty coverage=6 (which is the mean number of compliant treaties signed by OECD countries with tax havens in the 2008-2011 period), the total coefficient on Signed is −0.0498 + 6 × (0.0001 − 0.0120) = −0.12. This coefficient is comparable to the coefficient found in col. (2) than treaties with Vanuatu and Saint Lucia. We therefore construct a second measure of treaty coverage that weighs treaties according to their importance.
For each country i and haven j for which we have bilateral deposit data, we compute the share of i's deposits in tax havens which were placed in j during the first year of our sample. In 2004, the location of deposits was unaffected by the European Savings Directive which was not yet implemented, and largely unaffected by treaties which were still few in numbers. The shares, therefore, measure the relative importance of haven j to tax evaders of country i and are exogenous to recent policy developments. For each country-haven pair (i, j), we use the shares to weigh each treaty concluded by i with havens other than j. The resulting measure of treaty coverage takes values between zero (no treaty) and one (full coverage). By construction, this measure only takes into account treaty coverage over the 13 havens for which we have bilateral deposit data.
As col. (4) to (6) Tables 1 and 2 show that there is a strong correlation between treaty signature and subsequent deposit growth in tax havens. To conclude that the changes in deposits we observe are caused by treaties, we need to assume that in a counterfactual world without treaties, the deposits in the "treaty" and "no treaty" pairs would have grown similarly. This key identifying assumption deserves a careful examination.
Tests of Identification Strategy
We have conducted two tests of our identification strategy. A first test examines the possibility that tax havens might have systematically signed treaties with countries that were placing less and less deposits in their banks relative to the global trend, which would introduce a spurious relationship between treaty signature and deposit growth.
We investigate this possibility by running probit models of the form:
where T reaty ijq is a dummy equal to 1 if i and j sign an information exchange treaty in quarter q, Growth ijq captures the growth rate of the deposits held by savers of country i in haven j before quarter q, X ijq includes other bilateral factors, γ i denotes saver-country fixed effects and θ q time fixed effects.
We want to know whether the probability to sign a treaty is affected by past deposit growth rates, i.e. whether β 2 is different from zero. 17 We consider two measures of deposit growth: the percentage growth over the 4 quarters before q, and the percentage growth from 8 quarters to 4 quarters before q. The results are in Table 3 . As col. (1) shows, the probability to sign a treaty is not affected by the growth rate of deposits during the year preceding treaty signature. It is marginally affected by deposit growth from 8 quarters to 4 quarters before treaty signature, but this barely significant correlation disappears when we control for time fixed effects (col. 2): it reflects the fact that most treaties were signed during the financial crisis, when deposits were falling worldwide.
Col. (3) and (4) show that the level of deposits, distance, and GDP are significant determinants of the probability to sign a treaty. But when we control for those factors, the probability to sign a treaty remains unaffected by past growth rates of deposits. On average, treaties were not concluded by country-haven pairs where deposits were growing more slowly than the global trend.
Our second test examines whether the country-haven pairs that signed a treaty and those that did not experienced an otherwise similar evolution over the period of study.
The goal of this test is to make sure that the correlation we observe between treaty signature and subsequent deposit growth is not driven by an unobserved third factor such as a slowdown in the financial activity of relatively compliant havens.
17 The determinants of treaty signature have been studied theoretically by Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) , Eggert and Kolmar (2002) , and Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) , and empirically by Ligthart et al. (2011) , Bilicka and Fuest (2012) , and Elsayyad (2012) .
The idea of the test is simple: if a confounding trend were driving our results, then treaty signature should be associated with a subsequent lower growth of the haven activities that are unrelated to treaties. So we study how those unrelated activities evolve in the "treaty" and "no treaty" groups. We focus on the inter-bank activities of tax havens.
Haven-based banks receive large amount of deposits from foreign banks, which they use in turn to grant loans. Interbank deposits received by tax havens are unrelated to personal tax evasion, so they should not be affected by information exchange agreements.
But they are sensitive to the international business cycle, to domestic conditions in the havens, and more generally to any trend that could potentially confound our analysis of treaties. In col. (1)- (2) of Table 4 , we run the same regression for interbank deposits as we did for the deposits owned by "non-banks" in col. (2) Table   2 , our core specifications. The results show that treaties have zero effect on interbank deposits. In other words, interbank deposits have evolved similarly in the "treaty" and "no-treaty" pairs. The statistically significant effect of treaties on "non-bank" deposits is thus unlikely to be driven by an omitted differential time trend.
Our two tests establish that we have a reasonably valid natural experiment: the country-haven pairs in our sample have similar ex ante and ex post observable characteristics, the sole relevant difference being that some pairs signed an information exchange agreements while others did not. The correlations we document between treaty signature and subsequent deposit growth can thus be considered causal. We present below further robustness checks.
Robustness Tests
OECD countries have concluded many more treaties than developing countries. Our results, one could fear, might be driven by asymmetric shocks reducing the deposits of developed countries relative to those of developing countries, such as the [2008] [2009] financial crisis. To address this concern, we restrict the sample to OECD countries only. Table 4 show that the response to treaties is slightly larger in the OECD sample than in the full sample, though qualitatively similar. This result may come as a surprise given the large exchange rate movements that have occurred during the financial crisis. But it can easily be explained. The Online Appendix shows that the currency composition of deposits is strikingly similar in the group of "treaty" and "no treaty" country-pairs: it is not correlated with treaty signature. For this reason, exchange rate changes are absorbed by our time fixed-effects and do not interfere with the identification of the impact of treaties.
Col. (3)-(4) of
In a final robustness check, we sequentially add country-year dummies and haven-year dummies to the core specifications. Country-year dummies control for all time-varying factors at the country level, such as changes in compliance efforts, capital tax rates or the incomes of top earners who are most likely to hold assets in tax havens. Haven-year dummies control for all time-varying factors at the haven level, such as bank crises or changes in political environment. The results are reported in col. (7)- (10) of Table 4 . The estimated effects are robust to the inclusion of country-year dummies. When we include both country-year dummies and haven-year dummies, we still find a modest effect of treaties on deposits but are unable to identify a deposit shifting effect.
Deposits Held Through Sham Corporations
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence suggesting that clients of offshore banks all times who are the ultimate owner of the assets they manage. They must provide this information to foreign authorities that file information requests under a treaty.
The implication is that if tax evaders respond to treaty signature, then treaties con-18 See http://www.irs.gov/uac/Offshore-Tax-Avoidance-and-IRS-Compliance-Efforts. See also Zaki (2010) for anecdotal evidence on the use of sham corporations by Europeans, and Hanlon et al. (2011) for evidence on the use of sham offshore corporations by U.S. tax evaders for their U.S. investments.
cluded between havens like Switzerland and countries like France should affect the Swiss deposits held by French residents through sham corporations, i.e. the Swiss deposits that the BIS assigns to the British Virgin Islands, Panama, and other havens. Table 5 investigates whether this is the case by analyzing the evolution of haven-haven deposits. In col.
(1), we regress haven-haven deposits (e.g., Swiss deposits assigned to Panama) on the number of treaties concluded by banking havens (e.g., Switzerland) with non-haven countries (e.g., France). A treaty between France and Switzerland reduces the Swiss deposits registered as belonging to each tax haven by 0.7% on average. There is one caveat, however: since we cannot identify the ultimate owners of the 19 (exp(−0.59) − 1) × 10 = 4.5%.
deposits held through sham corporations, the results in Table 5 rely on variation at the haven level rather than variation at the country-haven-pair level. It is an unfortunate feature of cross-border bank deposits statistics that they are based on immediate rather than beneficial ownership. If deposit data were established on a beneficial ownership basis, almost no deposits would be assigned to the British Virgin Islands or Panama; more deposits would be assigned to the U.S., Italy, or France, and it would be easier to track the progress made in the fight against tax evasion.
The Compliance Effect of Treaties
The G20 initiative has caused a relocation of deposits between tax havens leaving the funds globally held offshore roughly unchanged. These results suggest that thus far the crackdown has not achieved much. It enables us, for one very important haven and 27 counterpart countries, to conduct 20 Switzerland comes second to the Cayman Islands in terms of deposits, but an exceptionally high fraction of deposits in Swiss banks seem to belong to individuals (80-90%, whereas our informed guess for the average across all havens is about 50%).
21 The data are available on the authors' websites. Switzerland. And indeed, when we use the same regression framework as in Section 4, we find that treaty signature has no statistically significant effect on the fraction of interest that taxpayers chose to declare. 22 Despite the G20 initiative, the general level of compliance of EU Swiss bank account holders remains very low, around 10-20%.
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The second type of evidence on tax enforcement comes from the OECD (2011), which has gathered data on the amount of taxes recovered due to increased compliance on the part of offshore account holders. Over the 2009-2011 period, the OECD (2011) reports an increase of almost EUR 14 billion in taxes paid in rich countries. This is certainly far from negligible. However, assuming that evaders paid in taxes and penalties an amount equivalent to 5% of their assets (which is what the OECD reports for Italy, Mexico, and the UK), then the OECD figures imply that about $350bn in offshore assets may have been disclosed to tax authorities. This figure falls short of the $6,000bn or so likely held by households in tax havens. 24 Taken at face value, the OECD's findings do not lend support to the view that compliance has considerably improved.
The evidence we have just described is far from systematic. There is no cross-country database on tax compliance comparable to the BIS' bank deposit statistics. So we cannot fully exclude a large increase in compliance in havens other than Switzerland. Better measuring compliance and its determinants is an important challenge for future research.
22 See Online Appendix. 23 The compliance figures reported on Figure 7 are upper bounds, for one simple reason. They are obtained by dividing interest declared by interest earned, but the denominator excludes interest earned by EU residents through sham corporations, and a very large fraction of Swiss bank fiduciary deposits are held through sham corporations.
24 Based on interviews with wealth managers, the Boston Consulting Group (2010) puts the amount of offshore wealth at $7,400bn in 2009. This figure is close to the one found by Zucman (2011) , who reckons that 8% of households' financial wealth is held in tax havens, which is around $6,000bn in 2008.
Concluding Remarks
Conventional wisdom among policymakers is that the G20 tax haven crackdown is a success. The evidence presented in this paper challenges this view. It suggests that, so far, treaties have led to a relocation of bank deposits between tax havens but have not triggered significant repatriations of funds. The least compliant havens have attracted new clients, while the most compliant ones have lost some, leaving roughly unchanged the total amount of wealth managed offshore.
Although this is disappointing, we emphasize that the G20 initiative is not useless.
We find evidence that some tax evaders have responded to the wave of tax treaties. Many experts were skeptical that upon request information sharing could achieve anything at all. Our results belie the most pessimistic views on the efficacy of treaties: even a weak threat of enforcement is sometimes enough to affect behavior. Further, uncertainties remain on the extent to which treaties have induced tax evaders to comply more with tax laws while keeping their funds offshore.
Yet our results suggest that there is room to substantially improve the fight against offshore tax evasion. First, the G20 should urge tax havens to sign treaties with all countries: a comprehensive multilateral agreement would prevent tax evaders from transferring their funds from haven to haven. Second, our results suggest that even in the presence of a complete network of upon request information exchange treaties, there would remain a scope for improved tax collection by making treaties more demanding.
The G20 tax haven crackdown is the most important coordinated initiative against tax evasion the world has ever seen. The second largest one is the European Union Savings Directive. The G20 initiative relies on information exchange treaties; the EU Savings Directive imposes a withholding tax on interest income earned by European residents in a number of cooperating tax havens. So far, both policies have significant pitfalls: treaties are not comprehensive enough; the EU withholding tax exempts equities and derivatives, and does not look through sham corporations that tax evaders routinely use (Johannesen, 2010; Zucman, 2011) . Therefore, what is the best tool -treaty or tax -to combat offshore tax evasion remains an open question. Another question raised by our study is why some havens cooperate more than others.
Tax havens have a strong economic interest in bank secrecy. But maybe abandoning bank secrecy has a positive effect on a haven's reputation, which may help it attract other financial activity, such as the incorporation of investment funds. This issue would deserve to be further analyzed. Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. *** denotes significance at the 1% threshold, ** at the 5% threshold, and * at the 10% threshold. The dependent variable is the stock of deposits held by savers of country i in banks of tax haven j at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. For a given haven j there are up to 220 saving countries i, and we consider the deposits held in 13 tax havens j. Signed is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between i and j in quarter q. N ewT reaty is a dummy equal to 1 if the event establishing information exchange is a new treaty; DomLaw is a dummy equal to 1 if the event establishing information exchange is a change in haven's j domestic law. Signed (Contemp) is a dummy equal to 1 in the quarter q when the legal event establishing information exchange between i and j occurs; Signed (+1 quarter) is a dummy equal to 1 in q + 1, and so on. Source: BIS, restricted bilateral locational banking statistics. Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. *** denotes significance at the 1% threshold, ** at the 5% threshold, and * at the 10% threshold. The dependent variable is the stock of deposits held by savers of country i in banks of tax haven j at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. Signed is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between i and j in quarter q. ST D is a dummy equal to one if the country-haven pair (i, j) applies the EU Savings Directive. In col.
(1)-(3), T reaty coverage counts the number of treaties that i has with tax havens other than j. In col. (4)-(6), T reaty coverage measures the share of the deposits held in 2004 by residents of country i in BIS-reporting havens that are covered by a treaty in quarter q. Source: BIS, restricted bilateral locational banking statistics. Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. *** denotes significance at the 1% threshold, ** at the 5% threshold, and * at the 10% threshold. The dependent variable is the stock of deposits held by savers of country i in banks of tax haven j at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. Signed is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between i and j in quarter q. ST D is a dummy equal to one if the country-haven pair (i, j) applies the EU Savings Directive. T reaty coverage counts the number of treaties that i has with tax havens other than j. Col. (3)-(10) consider the deposits held by non-bank agents; col. (1)-(2) the deposits held by banks. Source: BIS, restricted bilateral locational banking statistics. Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. *** denotes significance at the 1% threshold, ** at the 5% threshold, and * at the 10% threshold. The table investigates how the signature of a treaty between a tax haven (e.g., Switzerland) and a non-haven country (e.g., France) affects the deposits recorded by the BIS as belonging to tax havens (e.g., the deposits in Swiss banks recorded as belonging to Panama). The dependent variable is the stock of deposits recorded as belonging to haven i (e.g., Panama) in the banks of haven j (e.g., Switzerland) at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the haven-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. For a given banking haven j, there are up to 41 "saving" havens i. We consider the deposits held in 13 banking havens j. In col.
(1)-(2), T reaty coverage, banking haven with non-havens counts the number of treaties that j has with non-haven countries (and T reaty coverage,banking haven with other tax havens the number of treaties that j has with other havens). In col. (3)-(4), the T reaty coverage, variables measure the share of the deposits held by non-haven (reps. haven) countries in haven j in 2004 that are covered by a treaty in quarter q. Signed is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between haven i and haven j in quarter q. Source: BIS, restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
